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Objective: This paper aims to provide insight into information processing differences
between hot and cold risk taking decision tasks within a single domain. Decision theory
defines risky situations using at least three parameters: outcome one (often a gain) with
its probability and outcome two (often a loss) with a complementary probability. Although
a rational agent should consider all of the parameters, s/he could potentially narrow their
focus to only some of them, particularly when explicit Type 2 processes do not have the
resources to override implicit Type 1 processes. Here we investigate differences in risky
situation parameters’ influence on hot and cold decisions. Although previous studies
show lower information use in hot than in cold processes, they do not provide decision
weight changes and therefore do not explain whether this difference results from worse
concentration on each parameter of a risky situation (probability, gain amount, and loss
amount) or from ignoring some parameters.
Methods: Two studies were conducted, with participants performing the Columbia
Card Task (CCT) in either its Cold or Hot version. In the first study, participants also
performed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to monitor their ability to override Type 1
processing cues (implicit processes) with Type 2 explicit processes. Because hypothesis
testing required comparison of the relative importance of risky situation decision weights
(gain, loss, probability), we developed a novel way of measuring information use in the
CCT by employing a conjoint analysis methodology.
Results: Across the two studies, results indicated that in the CCT Cold condition
decision makers concentrate on each information type (gain, loss, probability), but in
the CCT Hot condition they concentrate mostly on a single parameter: probability of
gain/loss. We also show that an individual’s CRT score correlates with information
use propensity in cold but not hot tasks. Thus, the affective dimension of hot tasks
inhibits correct information processing, probably because it is difficult to engage Type
2 processes in such circumstances. Individuals’ Type 2 processing abilities (measured
by the CRT) assist greater use of information in cold tasks but do not help in hot tasks.
Keywords: Columbia Card Task (CCT), Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), dual process theory, dynamic risk taking,
experience based probability format, information use
Markiewicz and Kubin´ska Information Use in CCT Tasks
INTRODUCTION
Decision theory describes risky situations as choices between
lotteries characterized by outputs (gains and/or losses) and their
probabilities. A rational agent making decisions in compliance
with expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1953) should concentrate on each parameter of a decision
equally, thus taking into consideration all available information.
The assumption that outcomes (or functions of them) are
weighted by their probability underlies most economic and
behavioral theories. On the other hand, studies constantly show
that cognition is difficult and costly, partially because of peoples’
limited processing capacity, including attention (Chabris and
Simons, 2011). Among other things, this is why decision makers
first try to simplify a decision problem in the so called “editing
phase” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Because of attention
limitations they do not use all of the available risk information
when making a decision. Therefore, many research paradigms
(e.g., Active Information Search, Englander and Tyszka, 1980;
Huber et al., 1997 and Mouselab) investigate the order of
information acquisition (Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2011).
However, relatively little has been said about differences
in information use in affective (hot) and cognitive (cold)
risk processing. Do people concentrate on different risk
characteristics (losses of, and gains on, stakes, and their
probabilities) in emotional risk taking (e.g., parachute jumping)
compared to cognitive risk taking (e.g., pension scheme
decisions)? Some studies (Pachur et al., 2014; Suter et al., 2015)
have demonstrated that the impact of probabilities is strongly
diminished for affect-rich outcomes. However, these studies used
outcomes of different valences, assuming that medical outcomes
are affect-rich and that monetary outcomes are affect-poor. Thus,
they could have detected a domain difference (Sawicki and
Markiewicz, 2015) rather than an affect magnitude difference.
The assumption that probabilities have a diminished impact in
affect-rich outcomes has solid foundations: Rottenstreich and
Hsee (2001) and Sunstein (2002) both noted that affect-related
decisions are insensitive to probabilities, however, here again,
affect differences were mostly combined with different domains,
this confound possibly leading to an error in the conclusions
drawn. Thus, our present research question asked whether there
are differences in the importance of risky situations’ parameters
(gain/loss/probability) in hot and cold decision processes within
a single domain.
To explore differences in affective (hot) and cognitive (cold)
risk processing within a single domain, Hot, and Cold versions
of the Columbia Card Task (CCT) are used (Figner and Voelki,
2004; Figner et al., 2009). In each of the 63 rounds of both
versions of the computerized CCT a participant (P) is informed
about the number of loss cards (1, 2, or 3) hidden among 32 cards,
the point value associated with each loss card (250, 500, or 750),
and the point value associated with gain cards (10, 20, or 30)1.
In the Cold version of the CCT, participants state in advance how
1There is also a version of the CCT where every parameter can take one of two
levels (10 and 30 for gain amount, 1 and 3 for number of loss cards, 250 and 750
for loss amount), e.g., Figner andWeber (2011), Panno et al. (2012), Penolazzi et al.
(2012), and Buelow (2015).
many cards they want to turn over, in theHot version participants
turn over cards one-by-one until they decide to finish. In the Hot
version, participants receive feedback immediately after turning
over a card, while in the Cold version they receive feedback at
the end of the final (63rd) round. P’s task is to turn over cards
and to achieve as great a total gain as possible at the end of the
final round. Only 9 of the 63 rounds are generated randomly.
The remaining 54 are programmed in such a way that loss cards
appear at the end of the round (participants can choose cards
safely for up to 32 cards minus the number of loss cards). The
average number of turned over cards in the 54 rigged feedback
rounds is taken as a measure of risk taking.
Apart from assessing risk taking, the CCT allows the
calculation of “information use” Figner et al. (2009): the impact
of three risk parameters (the gain amount, loss amount, and
the probability of gains) on the risk taking behavior of an
individual. To date, CCT studies have concentrated mostly on
risk taking propensity (the number of turned over cards) in
adults and adolescents, risk taking propensity’s neural correlates
(van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015), risk taking propensity and
emotion regulation strategies’ correlates (Panno et al., 2012),
the relationship of CCT risk taking propensity with personality
traits (Penolazzi et al., 2012), and other risk measurement scores
(Buelow and Blaine, 2015). In the CCT research paradigm
papers usually report risk propensity scores, consideration of
information processing is often omitted (Panno et al., 2012;
Huang et al., 2013). However, CCT studies which have calculated
information use demonstrate that it is generally greater in cold
situations than in hot situations (Figner et al., 2009; Buelow,
2015). Here, though, we investigate which type of risk-related
information matters most in cold and hot processes. Risky
situations are traditionally defined by a set of characteristics
involving payoffs and their probabilities, and loss levels, and
their probabilities (von Neumann andMorgenstern, 1953). Thus,
we were interested in whether higher information use in cold
processes results from general or selective concentration on risky
situation characteristics.
Pachur et al. (2014) claim that in affect-poor situations
decision makers commonly rely on a compensatory process,
trading off outcomes, and probabilities, whereas in affect-rich
choices people more often rely on a non-compensatory heuristic
process. Thus, in cold tasks decision makers should place
significant weight on all three risk parameters (probability,
gain amount, loss amount), while in hot tasks they should
use a simplified approach and concentrate on one of the
risk parameters. We therefore hypothesized that (H1) decision
makers place different weights on risky situation parameters
(gain amount, loss amount, and probability of gains), while
making risky decisions in cold and hot tasks.
As defined by Figner et al. (2009), information use considers
the number of significant parameters (using a dummy variable
resulting from an ANOVA conducted for each participant for
each parameter of a risky situation separately). This does not
enable comparison of the decision weights for the decision
parameters considered. Thus, to test H1 we developed a new
way of measuring information use based on axiomatic Conjoint
Measurement Theory (CMT; Luce and Tukey, 1964; Krantz et al.,
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1971) and discussed in detail in Section The Columbia Card Task
(CCT). This new approach uses ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression to explain the number of cards turned over in a given
round in terms of the round’s risk characteristics. Transformed
regression betas serve as separate decision weights (summing to
1) for probability, loss, and gain amount—all expressed on an
interval scale to provide an effective test of H1.
We also investigated factors that make people use risky
situation-related information. In the view of dual-process
theories, the mind operates using two types of processes:
effortless and automatic processes (Type 1 processes, see
Evans and Stanovich, 2013) and effortful, rule-based processes
which use working memory resources (Type 2 processes). The
most prominent model concerning the interplay between these
systems is the “Default Interventionist” model, which suggests
that Type 2 processes can intervene and override intuitive Type
1 responses when feelings as to the correctness of the intuitive
answer are troublesome (Thompson et al., 2013)—see also
alternative models such as those of Handley and Trippas (2015)
and Pennycook et al. (2015). Further, the engagement of Type
2 explicit processes, which determine information use, depends
on task characteristics (Rolison et al., 2011, 2012). We speculate
that high emotional arousal associated with the CCT Hot version
decreases the chance of Type 2 process usage compared to the
CCT Cold version. If so, an individual’s abilities to use Type
2 explicit processes (cognitive abilities such as numerical skill
or working memory use) should predict information use only
in the Cold, but not the Hot, condition. Likewise, it would
be expected that WISC–III backward digit span test scores
(which measure the storage and manipulation of meaningless
numerical information: Wechsler, 1991) would be significantly
positively correlated with information use in the Cold, but not
the Hot, condition. However, previous research shows a positive
correlation for both conditions (Figner et al., 2009), although the
same study also demonstrated that tests of higher order executive
functions (the Key Search Task, Zoo Map Test, Water Test (all
from the Behavioral Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome task
battery: BADS–C), which involve skills such as planning, novel
problem solving, inflexibility, and perseveration, correlate with
information use in the Cold, but not the Hot, condition. All
these skills are assumed to be a function of involvement of
the dorsolateral region of the prefrontal cortex (Cohen, 2005;
Figner et al., 2009). Similarly, performance on the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task (WCST), which measures executive functions
(such as abstract thinking, problem solving, perseveration, and
cognitive set shifting), has been found to correlate with separate
information use scores only in the Cold condition (Buelow,
2015). Because of these contradictory results we used another
measure of cognitive ability: the Cognitive Reflection Test, CRT
(Frederick, 2005), which uses three simple numeracy questions to
assess an individual’s ability to resist reporting the first response
that comes to mind (generated by Type 1 processes) in favor
of a reflective correct answer (generated by Type 2 processes).
Thus, H2 was as follows: information use in the Cold condition
is related to an individual’s ability to resist Type 1 processing
cues. However, no such relationship was expected in the Hot
condition. In other words, the higher the ability to override
Type 1 with Type 2 cues (as shown by CRT score), the higher
is the ability to process all information (as indicated by the
information use parameter in the CCT) in cold risky decision-
making. We speculate that responding in the Hot task reflects a
failure of Type 2 processing to become engaged (i.e., emotions
block the possibility of overriding Type 1 with Type 2 cues):
under such circumstances even reflective people should not use
more information.
In the studies below we tested both hypotheses. Two studies
are presented. Study 1 tests both H1 and H2, but Study 2 tests
the robustness of H1 alone. H1 is tested by comparing decision
weights for probability, loss amount, and gain amount across
the hot and cold conditions, while H2 is tested by examining
correlational patterns.
METHODS
Study 1
Study 1 was conducted to verify both H1 and H2.
Measures
The Columbia Card Task (CCT)
Hot and Cold versions of the CCT2 (Figner and Voelki, 2004;
Figner et al., 2009) were used to track the deliberative (cold) and
affective (hot) processes involved in risk taking, and thereby to
test the two hypotheses.
In each of 63 computer-generated rounds, a participant sees
a deck of 32 cards (4 rows, 8 cards per row) face down. The
participant is informed about the particular characteristics of
a round: the number of loss cards (n) hidden among all the
remaining gain cards (32-n), the monetary amount associated
with each loss card, and the amount associated with the gain
cards. In both versions, the participant (P) faces a similar decision
problem, namely how many cards to turn over out of 32. In the
Hot task, the participant is provided with both win/loss feedback
after each card is turned over and feedback on the number of
points after each single round. In each round of the Hot task,
the participant points to a face-down card to turn it over and
reveal its face. If the card is a gain card (a smiling face), the
gain is added to the total game balance, and then the participant
points to the next card. The participant can turn over cards until
they decide that the risk of turning over the next card is too
high or until they encounter the loss cards. Contrary to the Hot
version, the Cold task only provides points feedback when the
participant completes the entire task. The participant does not
point to particular cards in the Cold task, but needs to decide
how many of the 32 cards to turn over in the particular round
that is described by the number of loss cards, loss amount, and
gain amount. Furthermore, the participant knows that a draw
will be made by the computer after they complete the entire task
of 63 rounds. Only these rigged feedback rounds are used as an
indicator of risk preference (measured as the average number
of turned over cards in all 54 rigged rounds) and information
use, which is quantified as the number of statistically significant
differences between groups defined by three categorical variables:
2Official webpage with demo version: http://www.columbiacardtask.org.
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probability of loss, loss amount, and gain amount.With the initial
value of information use set to 0, a value of 1 is added to the
information use parameter if an ANOVA calculated separately
for each respondent and each type of risk information reveals a
significant main effect (at a significance level of p < 0.05).
The previously proposed information use parameter (Figner
et al., 2009) does not enable comparison of the decision
weights of risky decision parameters (gain, loss, and probability)
at the individual level. Thus, we employ a conjoint analysis
methodology (Orme, 2010), rooted in CMT (Luce and Tukey,
1964; Krantz et al., 1971), to propose a new way of measuring
information use.
By analyzing individual choices with OLS regression [rather
than ANOVA as proposed by Figner et al. (2009)] we obtain
R2coefficients specific to individual respondents, reflecting the
extent of information’s influence on risk taking. The OLS
regression is calculated separately for each individual covering all
54 answers in rigged rounds, where the number of turned over
cards serves as the dependent variable and the relevant round
characteristics (gain level, loss level, and probability) are recoded
into dummy variables—each defined by one characteristic within
three possible levels of: gain (10, 20, 30), loss (250, 500, 750),
and probability (1, 2, or 3 hidden loss cards)—which serve
as independent variables. The independent variables are binary
variables taking values of 0 or 1, thus, to avoid correlation of
predictors (e.g., if the “2 hidden card” variable takes a value of
0, and the “3 hidden card” variable takes a value of 0, the “1
hidden card” variable must have a value of 1) each initial variable
(“10 gain”; “250 loss,” and “1 hidden card”) is excluded from the
regression equation following a common rule (Orme, 2010).
The regression R2 explains how well the choice parameters
(gain level, loss level, and probability) explain the number of
turned over cards. Thus, it can serve as an alternative information
use parameter–and potentially as an additional parameter for
screening non-rational respondents and those who did not
understand the task. Based on the regression coefficients (betas)
we derived part-worth utilities. At the very beginning, the
coefficients for the first levels of each attribute were derived
from the intercept, as one third of this coefficient. One third of
the intercept was also added to betas associated with the two
remaining levels of attributes. Finally the “zero-centered diffs,”
standardization procedure (Sawtooth Software, 2012) was used
to compare beta values between participants. The zero-centered
diffs procedure is simply a rescaling transformation performed
for each respondent. First, the mean of the betas for the three
levels for every attribute is subtracted from each beta to obtain
zero-centered data. Next, the coefficients are multiplied by a
factor such that the sums of the three differences in the best
and worst levels of each attribute is equal to the product of the
number of attributes (k) and 100. This gives an average 100 point
range in beta coefficients for every attribute. The final vector
of beta coefficients is reported as part-worth utilities for every
attribute level and these take values within the same interval scale.
Additionally, following a conjoint procedure, we calculated
the relative importance score (RIS) for each attribute–this
variable being measured on a ratio scale. The role of an attribute
in making a decision is measured by the range of its levels of
part-worth utilities. The RIS is the percentage that the range of
part-worth utilities for a certain attribute constitutes in the sum
of ranges of part-worth utilities for all attributes. RIS sum to 100%
and determine the relative impact of each attribute in the final
decision of each respondent, thus they are often called “decision
weights.” Finally, we also calculated the following variables:
Loss amount INDEX; Gain amount INDEX; Probability INDEX.
Thus, each index was multiplied by the product of its RIS
and its coefficient of determination (R2). This new way of
measuring information makes it possible to ascertain which
information type matters most in risky decision making—and
allows comparisons between respondents based on this.
To illustrate this novel conjoint approach to CCT data
analysis, let us consider responses given by an arbitrarily chosen
participant in the rigged rounds shown in Table 1. Following
Figner et al. (2009), three One-way ANOVAs should be run,
where independent variables (each with three levels) are Loss
cards, Gain amount, and Loss amount, and the dependent
variable is the number of turned over cards. Information use in
this approach is the number of ANOVAs that detect statistically
significant differences among number of turned over cards for
the three independent variables.
Data from Table 1 is then recoded, as shown in Table 2, to run
OLS regression. There are two dummy variables for Loss cards,
namely Loss cards (2), Loss cards (3), level 1 being implicitly
coded in these two dummy variables. If the Loss cards variable
takes a value of 1, then both Loss cards (2) and Loss cards (3) are
0; if Loss cards is 2, then Loss cards (2) is 1, while Loss cards (3) is
0; and finally if Loss cards is 3, then Loss cards (2) is 0, while Loss
cards (3) is 1. The variables Gain amount (20), Gain amount (30),
Loss amount (500), and Loss amount (750) are created similarly.
Let us assume that R2 = 0.367 and regression coefficients
are as follows: β0 = 29.537; βLossCard_2 = −1.278;
βLossCard_3 = −2.333; βGainAmount_20 = 0.85; βGainAmount_30 =
0.383; βLossAmount_500 = −0.3; βLossAmount_750 = 0.2 (the first
column of Table 3). The second column of Table 3 shows the
results of subtracting β03 from the initial coefficients obtained by
OLS regression. Following the “zero-centered diffs” procedure
(Sawtooth Software, 2012), the means of new betas (from column
2) are then calculated for every attribute, with results as follows:
Loss cards= 8.642; Gain amount= 10.257; Loss amount= 9.812.
In column 3, the results of subtracting themeans of each attribute
TABLE 1 | The example of an arbitrarily chosen participant’s responses on
the CCT.
Round No. Turned over cards Loss cards Gain amount Loss amount
1 15 3 10 750
2 32 2 10 750
3 15 2 30 250
4 24 1 10 250
5 7 2 20 500
6 15 2 20 750
. . .
53 12 1 10 500
54 26 2 20 750
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TABLE 2 | Transformed data from Table 1 for OLS regression.
No round No turned over cards Loss cards (2) Loss cards (3) Gain amount (20) Gain amount (30) Loss amount (500) Loss amount (750)
1 15 0 1 0 0 0 1
2 32 1 0 0 0 0 1
3 15 1 0 0 1 0 0
4 24 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 7 1 0 1 0 1 0
6 15 1 0 1 0 0 1
. . .
53 12 0 0 0 0 1 0
54 26 1 0 1 0 0 1
TABLE 3 | Calculation of part-worth utilities.
Beta Subtracting Subtracting Part-worth
β0
3
means utilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 29.537 – – –
Loss card (1) – 9.846 1.204 98.039
Loss card (2) –1.278 8.568 −0.074 −6.033
Loss card (3) −2.333 7.512 −1.130 −92.006
Gain amount (10) – 9.846 −0.411 −33.484
Gain amount (20) 0.850 10.696 0.439 35.747
Gain amount (30) 0.383 10.229 −0.028 −2.262
Loss amount (250) – 9.846 0.033 2.715
Loss amount (500) −0.300 9.546 −0.267 −21.719
Loss amount (750) 0.200 10.046 0.233 19.005
from the transformed betas in column 2 are presented. Part-
worth utilities are in column 4. These are calculated based on the
ranges of betas in column 3 for each attribute: the range for Loss
cards is 2.333; for Gain amount 0.850; and for Loss 0.500. The
sum of the ranges is 3.683, so every beta in column 3 is multiplied
by 81.448 (300/3.683) to render the sum of the three differences in
the best and worst levels of each attribute equal to 300. This gives
an average 100 point range in beta coefficients for each attribute.
From the part-worth utilities we can find the utilities for
any CCT round and can subsequently predict the participant’s
preferences between different CCT rounds. For example, the
round characterized by 2 loss cards, gain amount equal to 20,
and loss amount 750 has a utility of 48.715 (−6.033 + 35.747 +
19.005) and is less preferred than the round with 1 loss card, gain
amount 10, and loss amount 250, which has a utility of 67.270
(98.039+ (−33.484)+ 2.715).
Finally, the RIS for each attribute can be calculated. These are
63.35% for Loss cards, 23.07% for Gain amount, and 13.57% for
Loss amount. RIS coefficients are obtained by rescaling ranges
of part-worth utilities so that they sum to 100%. The ranges for
part-worth utilities are as follows: 190.045 for Loss cards, 69.231
for Gain amount, and 40.724 for Loss amount, these summing to
300. Based on RIS values, we can conclude that for the participant
whose decisions are presented in Table 1 the most important
attribute of the CCT rounds is probability while gain amount is
less important.
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
The CRT uses three simple numeracy questions to assess
individuals’ ability to resist reporting the first response that comes
to mind (generated by Type 1 processes/System 1) in favor of a
reflective correct answer (generated by Type 2 processes/System
2). Each question is scored in a binary manner: correct = 1 and
incorrect = 0, the total CRT score being the sum of these [a
natural number between 0 and 3, representing a range from no
correct answer (0) to three correct answers (3)]. Thus, higher
scores imply a higher ability to resist implicit System 1 processes.
Participants
All participants gave their informed consent in accordance with
the APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct,
being fully debriefed at the end the study. Participants performed
the study individually, in front of a computer separated from
other PC stations by cubicles, providing privacy from other
participants. Altogether N = 497 participants took part in Study
1 (73% females, aged M = 24.26; SD = 5.13), of which 380
were students of Cracow University of Economics and 117 were
Kozminski University students. Students participated for course
credits (with no monetary reimbursement) that depended on
their CCT total score.
Procedure
The experiment used Inquisit (2012) by Millisecond Software
(with a CCT script downloaded from the Inquisit Task Library).
First, participants completed a prognostic strategy task (as
described in Markiewicz et al., 2015)3 not related to this paper,
and then the CCT in either its Hot or Cold version. Initially a
long version of the CCT was used, with 63 rounds (27 × 2 + 9)
in both the Hot and Cold conditions, and with three levels per
parameter (1/2/3 loss cards, 10/20/30 gain amounts, 250/500/750
loss amounts). After the CCT, participants completed the CRT
(Frederick, 2005) and a sociodemographic questionnaire.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions,
taking either the Cold (n = 233, 74% females) or Hot (n = 264,
3This task was performed for the purposes of another study not related to the
current paper. The task did not involve a manipulation.
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TABLE 4 | The general results of Study 1.
Study 1 CCT Cold, n = 233 CCT Hot, n = 264 t-test p
M SD M SD
Risk taking (M number turned over cards) 14.000 5.303 27.185 3.173 −32.985 0.000
Info use (R2) 0.425 0.202 0.338 0.235 4.448 0.000
Info use (ANOVA) 1.382 0.843 0.803 0.691 8.301 0.000
Loss amount decision weight (RIS) 0.304 0.161 0.253 0.143 3.748 0.000
Gain amount decision weight RIS 0.251 0.143 0.221 0.131 2.442 0.015
Probability decision weight (RIS) 0.446 0.186 0.527 0.211 −4.552 0.000
Loss amount INDEX (RIS * R2) 0.120 0.084 0.068 0.048 8.339 0.000
Gain amount INDEX (RIS * R2) 0.097 0.069 0.061 0.055 6.407 0.000
Probability INDEX (RIS * R2) 0.208 0.153 0.209 0.207 −0.054 0.957
72% females) version of the CCT. A control analysis revealed
that participants were balanced in terms of gender (χ2 =
0.335), although cold condition participants (aged M = 24.77;
SD = 5.34) were slightly older [t(471.263) = 2.060; p = 0.04) than
hot condition participants (aged M= 23.81; SD= 4.90).
RESULTS
Study 1 Results
Results for the CCT risk taking propensity measure for the whole
sample are presented in Table 4.
On average, respondents performing the Hot task disclosed
more cards (M = 27.185; SD = 3.173) than those taking
part in the Cold condition (M = 14.000; SD = 5.303).
Those participating in the cold condition also displayed higher
information use, regardless of measure employed (Table 4). The
R2 measure, which we propose as a measure of information use,
correlated highly with the ANOVA base ratio: r(495) = 0.613;
p < 0.001.
There was a difference in weights (RIS) associated with
probability and payoffs at the general level (Table 4), indicating
that Cold participants paid relatively more attention (as
compared to Hot participants) to loss and gain amount
importance and less to probability information.
However, taking into account the generally higher level of
information use in the Cold condition, the above method
of analyzing data may be misleading. It is likely that lower
decision weights for probability in the Cold condition together
with increased information use may constitute the same level
of probability processing with an increased focus on the
remaining decision characteristics. Detailed analysis supported
this suspicion (Table 4): the probability index (RIS of probability
∗R2) remained virtually the same for both the Hot and Cold
conditions, while the loss amount index and the gain amount
index were both highly increased in the Cold condition.
Thus, the information use increase observed in the Cold
condition was mostly caused by increased concentration on
gains and losses in the Cold condition, while the focus on
probabilities remained similar in the Cold and Hot conditions,
supporting H1.
TABLE 5 | Correlations between CRT scores and information use (as
measured by R2 and ANOVA ratios), separately for the Cold and Hot
condition.
CRT correlation with… Study 1
Cold, n = 233 Hot, n = 264
Info use (R2) 0.303** 0.062
Info use (ANOVA) 0.349** 0.048
Loss amount decision weight (RIS) −0.032 −0.153*
Gain amount decision weight (RIS) −0.038 −0.003
Probability decision weight (RIS) 0.058 0.106
Loss amount INDEX (RIS * R2) 0.226** −0.049
Gain amount INDEX (RIS * R2) 0.202** 0.034
Probability INDEX (RIS * R2) 0.185** 0.073
Significance codes: **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Hypothesis H2 suggested that information use would correlate
with CRT scores. For the two conditions combined, this
hypothesis was confirmed in respect of both the newly proposed
R2 parameter [r(495) = 0.182; p < 0.001] and the ANOVA
parameter [r(495) = 0.225; p < 0.001). The relationships were,
however, specific to the Cold condition, and did not occur for the
Hot condition (see Table 5 for details).
As shown in Table 6, decision weight (RIS) correlated highly
with information use: the more a decision can be explained
by risk parameters, the more decision makers care about
probabilities, and less about pay-offs. This confirms the role of
the loss probability parameter in both cold and hot processing.
Study 1 Interim Discussion
Study 1 demonstrated that in affect-poor situations decision
makers are more likely to focus on all risk parameters (and thus
could rely on a compensatory process trading-off outcomes and
probabilities), whereas in affect-rich choices people more often
rely on a noncompensatory heuristic process (thus focusing on a
single risk situation parameter—here, probability). This supports
H1. One could however argue that in the current affect-rich
situation (CCTHot) people focused on probability because it was
the only dynamically changing parameter. For example, having
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TABLE 6 | Correlations between information use (as measured by R2 and ANOVA 5%) and task decision weights.
RIS Info use R2 Info use ANOVA 5% Info use R2 Info use ANOVA 5%
Study 1 Cold, n = 233 Hot, n = 264 Cold, n = 233 Hot, n = 264 All, n = 497 All, n = 497
Loss amount decision weight (RIS) −0.280** −0.519** −0.175** −0.261** −0.360** −0.138**
Gain amount decision weight (RIS) −0.331** −0.444** −0.012 −0.187** −0.359** −0.047
Probability decision weight (RIS) 0.497** 0.626** 0.160* 0.293** 0.514** 0.136**
Study 2 Cold, n = 44 Hot, n = 198 Cold, n = 44 Hot, n = 198 All, n = 242 All, n = 242
Loss amount decision weight (RIS) −0.260 −0.082 0.069 −0.094 −0.128* −0.068
Gain amount decision weight (RIS) −0.497** −0.293** −0.299* −0.257** −0.342** −0.275**
Probability decision weight (RIS) 0.625** 0.299** 0.161 0.282** 0.375** 0.271**
Significance codes: **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
the information that there are 2 loss cards hidden among 32
cards, one knows that the probability of turning over a loss card
is initially 2/32. After turning over the next card, the probability
rises to 2/31, and after the third card to 2/30, etc. The other
game parameters remain constant and do not change with each
turned over card, it being a widely known phenomenon that
people concentrate on change and not on states (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). To control this we conducted Study 2 with
delayed feedback in the CCT Hot condition.
Study 2
Based on the above results verifying H1, we can state that
probabilities are the most important risk parameter in the Hot
task. Study 2 was conducted to provide better understanding
of the role of probabilities while making risk decisions in the
Hot task. We amended the CCT Hot procedure to freeze the
probability parameter in a single round, making it constant for
the whole of a round. Doing this allowed us to test whether the
result of Study 1was determined by positive immediate feedback
causing changes in the probability parameter each time a card was
turned over.
Procedure
To address the issues raised in the previous section we used
a delayed feedback procedure for the Hot condition4 (also
developed by Figner, private communication), sometimes called
the “CCT warm” condition (Huang et al., 2013). In the amended
task a participant points to the cards to turn over (one after
another), but needs to click a special button at the end of the
round to turn over all cards pointed at (they are revealed in
the order that they were pointed at). With this modification,
participants need to make the decision before they see the
sequence of turned over cards. Thus, the probability of loss does
not change over a single round, and pointing to a card to turn
over does not increase the probability of turning over a loss card
on the next move.
Altogether, 242 Kozminiski University and CracowUniversity
of Economics students (62% females, aged M = 26.87; SD =
4.90) took part in Study 2. The participants performed either the
CCT Cold task (n = 44) or the CCT Hot delayed feedback task
4 The script can be downloaded from the Inquisit Task library.
(n = 198)5. A control analysis revealed that participants were
balanced in terms of age (p > 0.05), however females were over-
represented in the Cold condition (86%) compared to the Hot
delayed condition (57%). Since the Hot condition is usually more
time consuming than the Cold condition, to save participants’
time, and to make the duration of the two conditions more
comparable, we developed a shorter CCT Hot delayed version.
This had 32 rounds: 3 probability levels (1/2/3 loss cards) × 3
gain amounts (10/20/30) × 3 loss amounts (250/500/750) = 27
rounds, plus 5 rigged rounds distributed randomly. Thus, the
shortening involved only the number of task rounds (similar
to Huang et al., 2013; Holper and Murphy, 2014) but not the
number of levels as in Figner and Weber (2011), Panno et al.
(2012), Penolazzi et al. (2012), and Buelow (2015).
Because of the amendment, the results for the Study 2 CCT
Hot condition cannot be directly compared to those of Study
1. Study 2 was conducted to verify the role of the probability
parameter in the Hot task, which is specifically related to H1, thus
participants did not complete the CRT (Frederick, 2005) which
related only to H2. As in Study 1, students participated for course
credits, which depended on their total CCT performance. The
students participating in studies 1 and 2 were mutually exclusive.
Results
Table 7 below presents the results of Study 2. In the Hot delayed
condition, participants demonstrated comparable information
use levels to the Cold condition (as measured both by ANOVA
and R2 based ratios), with no significant differences in the
number of turned over cards.
The fact that the Hot delayed condition and the Cold
version of the CCT do not differ significantly in terms of total
information use shows that blocking positive feedback in the
Hot version makes it similar to the Cold version. Although
there were some differences in participants’ treatment of certain
risk attributes, Cold condition participants paid more attention
(compared to Hot participants) to gain amount and less to
probability information.
5 The unequal group sizes were intentional given the analytical focus of the new
CCT Hot delayed methodology. We employed random sampling with 1 cold
participant for every 5 recruited for Study 2.
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TABLE 7 | The general results of Study 2.
Study 2 CCT Cold, n = 44 CCT Hot delayed, n = 198 t-test p
M SD M SD
Risk taking (M number turned cards) 15.076 6.519 14.823 6.448 0.235 0.815
Info Use (R2) 0.614 0.618 0.783 0.603 −1.676 0.095
Info use (ANOVA) 0.841 0.608 1.051 0.746 −1.740 0.083
Loss amount decision weight (RIS) 0.343 0.175 0.308 0.144 1.374 0.171
Gain amount decision weight (RIS) 0.297 0.139 0.251 0.129 2.105 0.036
Probability decision weight (RIS) 0.360 0.183 0.441 0.165 −2.853 0.005
Loss amount INDEX (RIS * R2) 0.130 0.090 0.145 0.096 −0.970 0.333
Gain amount INDEX (RIS * R2) 0.107 0.054 0.113 0.071 −0.480 0.632
Probability INDEX (RIS * R2) 0.166 0.156 0.221 0.138 −2.322 0.021
Detailed analysis of parameter contributions toward R2
(Table 7) showed that information use in the delayed Hot
feedback condition grew mostly through a focus on probability
(compared to the Cold condition) with a relatively similar
focus on loss and gain amounts. Thus, even after desensitizing
participants to permanent changes in probabilities (by replacing
the Hot version with the Warm delayed feedback version),
probability remained the most significant parameter. In the
CCT Hot version participants concentrate on the distribution
of every trial, i.e., the Bernoulli distribution, which involves the
probability of success (a gain card) which is dependent on the
number of cards already turned over (t), the number of loss
cards (n) in the round: 32−t−n32−t , and the probability of failure
(a loss card) which has a probability of n32−t . Thus, in the
CCT Hot task t changes with every turned over card, and the
probabilities of success, and failure also change. In the CCT
Warm version, probability is still important, but we suspect
that participants consider a binomial distribution rather than a
Bernoulli distribution. With every card selected, the probability
of success and failure are the same, being equal to 32−n32 and
n
32 respectively. A participant makes a decision about the total
number of turned over cards, i.e., the number of independent
Bernoulli trials in the binomial distribution, and is ultimately
interested in the overall probability of turning over all success
cards and no loss card.
In the more demanding Hot version of the CCT, the focus
is on probabilities too. The Study 2 result cannot be attributed
to changes in the risk parameters that are typical of the Hot
task because in the Hot delayed condition positive feedback
(which is the most important feature of the CCT Hot task) was
disabled.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
A set of two experiments yielded data supporting both
hypotheses. The CRT (Frederick, 2005) is considered to be a
tool measuring the cognitive ability to suppress an intuitive and
spontaneous (Type 1 processes) wrong answer in favor of a
reflective and deliberative (Type 2 processes) correct answer. We
showed that CCT information use (measured using bothANOVA
and OLS based indices) correlates with CRT score only in the
Cold condition and not in the Hot condition. This means that the
ability to use Type 2 processes is a good predictor of information
usage in CCTCold, but NOT inHot, processing.When cognition
is flooded with affect (in affective tasks) the aforementioned
ability is not related to information processing. Thus, H2 was
supported. Moreover, the result provides an argument that the
CCT Cold task requires mostly Type 2 processes, while the CCT
Hot task is dominated mostly by Type 1 processes.
We have also suggested a new method of information use
parameter calculation. The original method (Figner et al., 2009)
is based on ANOVA and the outcome parameter is measured
on a scale ranging from 0 to 3 (0 = no parameters taken
into account, 3 = all three parameters taken into account).
In doing this, however, the researcher cannot say—at the
individual level—which risky situation parameter (probability,
gain amount, loss amount) influences the decision maker most,
e.g., the researcher knows that both probability and degree of
loss influence a decision, but they do not know which parameter
is more important for the decision maker. As a methodological
insight, we employed a conjoint analysis methodology (Orme,
2010) to propose a new way of measuring information use.
Thus, analyzing individual choices with OLS regression (as
opposed to the ANOVA method proposed by Figner et al.,
2009) provides an individual respondent-specific R2coefficient
reflecting the magnitude of information’s influence on risk
taking. Additionally, we have suggested further mathematical
transformations of regression betas to obtain: (1) the equivalent
of conjoint utilities (part-worths) for each information level
and (2) the average relative importance score (referred to as
decision weights, summing up to 100%) for each of the three
task parameters–loss probability, gain amount, and loss amount.
We can therefore compare the influence of each information
type on decision making—and make comparisons between
respondents. We used the new information use parameter to
verify H1.
As demonstrated, in the Cold condition decision makers
concentrate on each information type (gain, loss, probability),
while in the Hot condition concentration on probabilities
virtually monopolizes the decision making process, making loss,
and gain amount almost unnoticeable. Making a decision based
on one risk parameter in the Hot CCT task is simpler and more
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heuristic in nature thanmaking one based on three parameters in
the Cold CCT task. This supports H1.
The dominance of one parameter in the Hot task
(heuristic, simplified decision making), as compared to more
comprehensive information processing focusing on all available
information, was an expected result. Similar dominance of one
dimension of a problem over another can be found in studies of
moral judgments where an individual faces a conflict between
moral rules and the consequences of alternative actions. In these
types of problem, people analyze the consequences more when
affective arousal is low (indirect action), but when arousal is
high they usually rely on their moral intuitions (direct action,
direct contact: Paharia et al., 2009; Białek et al., 2014). Previous
studies (Pachur et al., 2014; Suter et al., 2015) have demonstrated
that in the context of outcomes laden with affective responses
the traditional assumption of expectation maximization may
not apply. While the current study is in line with this notion, it
yielded opposite results regarding probability importance in hot
vs. cold risk taking situations. While Pachur’s study and other
studies have shown a diminished role of probability information
in the Hot task, our study ran contrary, demonstrating an
increased role of probability in the Hot task. A couple of factors
can explain this difference. It is worth noting that the previous
studies (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001; Pachur et al., 2014;
Suter et al., 2015) used different modality stimuli for affect-rich
and affect-poor outcomes (e.g., medical vs. monetary, pain vs.
monetary, etc.) to show that for affect-rich outcomes people
refrain from focusing on the probability of outcomes. This
result could, however, stem from both an affect load difference
between conditions and domain differences (some domains are
more naturally suited to concentrating on probabilities than
others (Sawicki and Markiewicz, 2015). Thus, we believe that
researching the effect of affect-rich and affect-poor outcomes
within one domain (here: monetary) is critical. After doing this,
we demonstrated that in a Hot task people act in a simplified way,
concentrating on only one parameter, mostly probability. So, for
affect-rich choices the process of weighing possible outcomes by
their probabilities is biased.
Our results are in line with other CCT studies—e.g., Buelow
(2015, p. 184) says “It appears that participants in the CCT-
cold condition paid greater attention to all three information
use variables in making decisions than those in the CCT-hot
condition, in which riskier performance was only associated with
loss probability.”
We believe that this result can be potentially explained in two
other ways related to task specificity:
1. The Hot and Cold CCT tasks employed did not only differ in
the affect load of their outcomes. The greater affect load of the
CCT Hot outcomes, as compared to the Cold outcomes, was
obtained by providing immediate feedback to respondents in
the Hot task (Loewenstein et al., 2001). This makes the whole
situation more dynamic (Wallsten et al., 2005; Weber and
Johnson, 2008). Thus, the real probability of loss dynamically
changes after each turned over card. On the other hand, many
theories (the most prominent example being prospect theory:
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) predict that people concentrate
not on states, but on changes relative to a reference point.
Thus, decision makers could concentrate on probability since
it is the only parameter changing dynamically within a single
round. However, by postponing feedback in Study 2 we
demonstrated that even when the dynamic nature of the
task is excluded, a similar effect of increased probability
concentration in the Hot task (relative to the Cold task) is
obtained.
2. Tyszka and Zaleskiewicz (2006) hypothesized that people
are less sensitive to probabilities when they are faced with
a single-choice situation than when they are faced with a
series of lotteries with different probabilities. Thus, treating
each card click in the Hot task as a separate lottery could
make the whole task similar to a “series of lotteries” type
of task, sensitizing decision makers to probabilities, and
making probability a more salient parameter. Although
Tyszka and Zaleskiewicz’s (2006) study did not manage to
positively verify their hypothesis, they provided a valuable
theoretical justification using the “evaluability hypothesis”
(Hsee, 1996; Hsee and Leclerc, 1998). In a series of studies
Hsee demonstrated that attributes perceived as difficult to
evaluate may become evaluable through direct comparison,
such attributes eventually becoming more important in the
decision process. Quite simply, the possibility of direct
comparison of options differing in some feature increases
the importance of the feature relative to situations where
options are presented in isolation. The evaluability hypothesis
can be applied to the CCT Hot task, which makes the
probability parameter more salient. As noted by Tyszka and
Zaleskiewicz “The probability parameter can be difficult to
evaluate, particularly by people who have little experience with
probabilistic judgment (...). When an individual is confronted
with the same scenario several times, and the only parameter
that changes is probability, the individual has a possibility
to compare the target probability level with other levels of
probability and to attach more weight to it” (p. 1630).
The above interpretation of the observed increase in focus on
probabilities in the dynamic, repeated CCT Hot task makes a
practical contribution in the area of possible corrective actions.
Even if we know that decision makers often neglect probabilities
for affect-rich outcomes (Sunstein, 2002), the repeated choice
method seems to be a perfect tool to resensitize decision
makers to probabilities. The problem of ignoring probability is
important–as expressed by Suter et al. (2015) “. . . to the extent
that people show strongly attenuated sensitivity to probability
information (or even neglect it altogether) in decisions with
affect rich outcomes, different decision aids may be required to
help them make good choices. For instance, professionals who
communicate risks, such as doctors or policy makers, may need
to pay special attention to refocusing people’s attention on the
probabilities of (health) risks by illustrating those risks visually”
(p. 19). Presently, we demonstrated that repeated choice is also
an efficient way of focusing attention on probabilities. It is worth
noting that the repeated choices in the CCT Hot task can be
interpreted as an “experienced probability” format for presenting
outcome frequencies (Weber, 2006; Tyszka and Sawicki,
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2011). Studies show that, compared to using percentages or an
iconographic format, such a format allows people to ascertain
probabilistic information more easily, even where the situation
involves affect. Tyszka and Sawicki’s (2011) Study 2 “. . . showed
that for the emotionally laden stimuli, the experience-based
probability format resulted in higher sensitivity to probability
variations than other formats of probabilistic information.
These advantages of the experience-based probability format
are interpreted in terms of two systems of information
processing: the rational deliberative vs. the affective experiential
and the principle of stimulus-response compatibility”
(p. 1832).
We have made a methodological advance in employing a
conjoint analysis methodology (Orme, 2010) as a new way of
measuring information use in the CCT, demonstrating its further
usefulness in judgment and decision making studies (Czupryna
et al., 2014; Bialek et al., 2015). We believe that this can be
potentially useful in future studies investigating decision weights
for particular information types in the CCT. Previous methods
of computing the information use parameter would not have
allowed the present conclusions to be reached.
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